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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to examine the possible involvement of private sector airport 
management in Japan, particularly at Kansai airport. A comparison is undertaken with 
the UK airport industry, as some parallels can be drawn with this country around the 
1990s when it went through a period of aviation liberalization and privatization of its 
airports. The findings suggest that private sector involvement in Japan has the potential 
to be successful, arguably as in the UK, and may help overcome certain problems facing 
Japanese airports, especially those associated with the funding system and lack of 
integrated airport management models. However financial problems at the airports, and 
especially the huge debt at Kansai, are likely to make it challenging to attract the private 
sector investors that are needed. 
KEYWORDS: Privatization, Concession, Japan, United Kingdom 
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1. Introduction 
Both the UK and Japan have a very significant airport industry with similar levels of 
traffic. In 2012 UK airports handled a total of 224 million passengers whilst 238 million 
passengers passed through Japanese airports. This is in spite of the population of Japan 
being twice that of the UK (127 million compared to 63 million in 2013) and a larger 
land mass in Japan, resulting in around 336 people per square km in Japan and 257 in 
the UK1. Both countries are dominated economically by their capital cities of Tokyo 
and London. However Japan has a far greater number of airports, approximately 100 
compared to around 60 in the UK.
Whilst there are many differences between the UK and Japanese air transport 
environments, it can be argued that the present Japanese situation is, to some extent, 
similar to that experienced in the UK around the 1990s. At that time the dominant 
position of the London airports, and in particular Heathrow, began to be somewhat 
eroded with the development of many new services out of the regional airports. 
Heathrow was congested whereas there was ample capacity in the regions. New services 
from the regions were also encouraged by an increasingly liberal airline regulatory 
environment and the emergence of the low cost carrier (LCC) sector. Currently in Japan 
the airports serving Tokyo are congested whilst there is excess capacity in the regions. 
In addition a more liberal aviation regulatory regime is progressively being established 
in Japan and LCCs are gaining market share.
However the ownership and regulatory regime of the airport industry in the two 
countries is very different. The UK was the first country in the world to introduce 
airport privatization in 1987. Consequently in the last twenty five years, most of major 
UK airports have passed into partial or full private ownership, with some companies 
owning more than one UK airport. By contrast almost all Japanese airports are owned 
and managed by public authorities. The Japanese government also plays an important 
role as a major shareholder in Tokyo-Narita, Osaka-Kansai and Chubu-Centrair 
international airports which are public limited companies. There are a number of key 
problems associated with the nature of the industry in Japan, particularly associated 
with the funding system, and the lack of integrated airport management models which 
are responsible for both the airfield and terminal facilities. One possible solution that 
5has been proposed to overcome some of the difficulties facing Japanese airports is 
airport privatization and group or ‘package’ ownership that has been experienced in the 
UK.
Therefore the aim of this research is to examine whether there are any lessons that can 
be learnt from the UK situation that can be applied to the Japanese airport industry as it 
moves into new and uncharted waters. The overall structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section 2 looks generally at airport management and ownership. Section 3 then 
considers the UK situation in detail, focusing on investors, group ownership and 
concession operations. This leads on to Section 4 which discusses the challenges facing 
the Japanese airports, and in particular developments at Kansai and Itami airports. 
Section 5 discusses the comparative analysis between the two countries and draws 
conclusions.
2.  Airport management and ownership
During the last 25 years, a number of airports throughout the world have been privatized 
with around a quarter of all airports now being under partial or total private control2. 
The objectives of such privatizations have been very varied, with two key drivers being 
the need for investment finance and improvements in efficiency. Other goals have 
included financial gains to the state; less state influence; improvements in quality and 
responsiveness to customers; improvements in management expertise; and greater 
opportunities to diversify activities3. These strategic priorities set by government have 
key implications for the type of privatization model that is adopted4,5.
Indeed privatization is a very broad term. Sometimes it is described as the transfer of 
ownership to private organizations, and sometimes the focus is purely on the transfer of 
management (which might be defined as public private partnerships (PPPs) or private 
finance initiatives (PFIs) rather than privatization). An important consideration is the 
degree of government control that exists, with partial privatization tending to be the 
more popular option. For instance globally 19 per cent of airports are owned by mixed 
public-private shareholders compared to 8 per cent that are fully privatized6. Clearly, 
this is primarily because governments feel the need to retain at least some stake in their 
airports as these are considered vital national or regional assets, having both economic 
benefits and environmental costs to the communities that they serve.
6Of the different privatization options, concession type models have been popular in 
most parts of the world7. These are the privatization models that are currently being 
considered in Japan. ICAO8 showed that 164 out of 578 global airports had concession 
or leasing arrangements. Likewise within Europe, around a third of all airports were 
identified as falling into this category9. For this paper a concession agreement is defined 
as relating to the operation of government-owned assets by a separate organization for a 
specified period of time. The opportunities for investment will depend on the risks 
involved and how these will be allocated between the airport operator and the 
government10,11. 
The UK has a mixed private-public sector airport industry with a variety of different 
governance models:
• Private ownership (e.g. London City Airport)
• Private share flotation (e.g. the former company BAA - now Heathrow Airport 
Holdings. This operator is now delisted)
• Total private trade sale (e.g. Leeds Bradford, Bristol, Liverpool)
• Partial private trade sale (e.g. Manchester, Birmingham, Newcastle, Norwich)
• Concession agreement with public ownership (e.g. Luton)
• Public ownership (e.g. Cardiff, Highland and Islands (HIAL))
The majority of the totally or partially publicly owned airports in the UK have local 
government shareholders but are managed in a financially independent way. By contrast 
in Japan, there are only three airports (Narita, Centrair and Kansai) that have been 
corporatized with integrated management which is responsible for both the airfield and 
terminal facilities. Even here the majority of their shares are owned by the public sector. 
Narita airport is wholly owned by the central government whilst Centrair is partly 
owned by the public sector (48.69%). Up until June 2012, Kansai airport was majority 
owned by the government (66.56%) and municipal governments (15.23%), but it has 
now been taken over by the central government and merged with Itami airport as a 
concession. The new Kansai International Airport Company (NKIAC) intends to sell 
the concession rights to the private operator. All the other airports in Japan are publicly 
owned.
3. The UK experience
73.1 Privatization developments
The pattern of ownership changed in the UK because of the 1986 Airports Act 12, 13. 
Prior to this all airports were owned by the public sector. Privatization has led to a 
number of airport groups or investors that manage or own more than one airport in the 
UK including Heathrow Airport Holdings, Peel Group/Vantage, Global Infrastructure 
Partners (GIP), Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Manchester Airport Group (MAG), 
Stobart Holdings, Regional and City airports (Balfour Beatty) and Highlands and 
Islands Airports (HIAL)14. These companies traditionally had different spheres of 
operation such as Peel (property), Balfour Beatty (infrastructure), Stobart (logistics) and 
GIP (investment funds), or are specialist airport operators, such as MAG and HIAL.
It can be argued that group operations can potentially help airport operators achieve 
economies of scale, make best use of resources and expertise, and enable a more 
strategic and coordinated approach to airport development. However, on the other hand, 
it may significantly inhibit competition. For a number of the airport groups in the UK, 
the airports do not share the same catchment area and so can benefit from common 
operations without there being any possible detrimental impact on competition. Indeed 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) generally found that the UK regional airport industry 
operated in a competition manner15. However there have been a few cases when group 
ownership has not gone ahead because of anti-competitive fears, for example with the 
cases of Belfast International and Belfast City airport, or the cases of Bristol and Exeter 
airport. The most extensive debates have occurred with the former BAA group of 
airports which were privatized in 1987. Eventually in 2009 the Competition 
Commission concluded that common ownership had inhibited competition and BAA 
was required to sell Gatwick, Stansted and Glasgow or Edinburgh16. Gatwick, 
Edinburgh and Stansted have now been sold. 
Airport operators in the UK, especially in the regions, generally benefitted from strong 
growth spurred on particularly by airline deregulation and the emergence of the LCC 
sector in the early 2000s (Table1). Indeed the overall LCC market share increased from 
just 14 per cent in 2000 to over 40 per cent in 200817 - in many cases encouraged by 
attractive deals offered by the airports. However in recent years, growth has fallen at 
many airports and services have been dropped, primarily as a result of the much more 
volatile era brought on with the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent 
8economic recession. Some of the airports, such as Belfast International, Bournemouth, 
Cardiff and East Midlands, which typically experienced some of the greatest increases 
in traffic in the boom period of LCC expansion, have also tended to see the largest 
contraction in recent years. These changing fortunes for the airports are also reflected in 
lower profits levels (or losses) for the majority of airports (Table 2) in more recent 
years. Nevertheless the majority of the airports still managed to achieve relatively large 
operating margins - which would be the envy of most airlines - in spite of reductions in 
traffic volume. Moreover the UK airport industry is now generally considered to be 
much more commercially focused than before, with a prime illustration of this being 
that more than 40 per cent of revenue on average is now generated from non-
aeronautical sources. 
 
TABLE 1 AND 2 HERE
However, the challenging economic conditions made some airports less attractive to 
investors and in some cases secondary airport sales have occurred. For example 65 per 
cent of Peel Airports was sold to the international airport Vantage Airport Group 
(previously Vancouver Airport Services) in 2011 when it faced financial problems. 
Elsewhere MAG sold Humberside airport in 2012, as did Copenhagen airport with 
Newcastle, when these airports no longer fitted in with the parent company’s 
development strategy. Meanwhile Cardiff airport, which has experienced a dramatic 
decline in traffic in recent years, has actually been bought back to public ownership by 
the Welsh government, after 18 years in private hands, in an effort to turn around the 
fortunes of the airport. Its former owner Abertis has also disposed of its other UK 
airports. In addition, Prestwick airport is now back under public ownership with the 
Scottish government. 
3.2 The Luton concession
As a concession type of privatization approach is being planned for Japan, it is useful to 
consider the experience of such a model in the UK. This is limited to Luton airport as 
this is the only UK airport to have adopted a concession arrangement. The airport is 
owned solely by Luton Borough Council, becoming a limited company operator in 
1987. It is one of a number of airports serving the London area and so in 1990 it was 
renamed London Luton airport to reinforce this position. However in 1991, faced with a 
decline in traffic (especially as one of its main customers Ryanair had moved to nearby 
9Stansted) an unsuccessful attempt was made to sell the airport. Subsequently in 1998 a 
consortium originally consisting of Barclays Investment, Bechtel Enterprises, and 
Airport Groups International (AGI) (which was subsequently bought by TBI in 1999 
which became part of Abertis) was given the 30-year concession to run the airport. A 
concessionaire-type arrangement was chosen, rather than a flotation or trade sale, since 
the local government owners had promised not to relinquish total control of this 
publicly owned asset to private hands. Barclays and Bechtel subsequently sold off their 
interest in this airport. The airport concession was owned by Airport Concessions and 
Development Ltd (ACDL) which is a Spanish company owned by Abertis 
Infrastructures (90%) and the airport group AENA International (10%) until 2013 when 
it was transferred to AENA (51%) and AXA Private Equity (49%).
The arrangement involves an annual concession based on passenger and cargo traffic 
with a guaranteed minimum payment. In 2010 the annual fee was in excess of £20 
million and overall more than £210 million in fees has been made since the concession 
started in 1998. The council had the right to terminate the concession agreement 
halfway through its term subject to required notice and termination payments being paid 
to reflect the value of the remaining years of the concession and other liabilities. As can 
be seen from Tables 1 and 2 the airport has generally benefitted from the growth in 
traffic in the last years (2009 and 2010 being exceptions), stimulated by LCC growth 
which is now its main market (it is a major base for easyJet), and has had relatively 
healthy profits. 
Nevertheless there have been some issues related to the fixed term nature of the 
concession weakening incentives to invest because of the uncertainties of making an 
adequate return on investment. In 2006 the airport operator published a master plan that 
proposed an extended runway and a new terminal. However in 2007 it decided not to 
pursue these plans and to instead make better use of the existing site and facilities. The 
limited period remaining before the end of the recession was cited as one of the reasons 
for this, albeit that the expansion plans at nearby Stansted airport were also likely to 
have played a key role in this decision. Then in 2012 Luton Borough Council published 
a new master plan for the airport. This was arguably viewed as an indication that the 
council wanted to terminate the concession at its half way stage to get more investment 
under a new contract and as a threat to the current concession agreement. The airport 
operator Abertis subsequently unveiled its own plans for the airport’s expansion which 
could have been considered as its bid to retaining its concession. Eventually the two 
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bodies agreed on a development programme and as a consequence the concession 
agreement has now been extended to 2031. Such developments illustrate the problems 
with reaching agreements between concession partners over the required investment that 
is needed if it is not stipulated in detail in the concession agreement.
4. The Japanese situation
4.1 The structure of the airport industry and current issues
Since 2008, Japanese airports have been classified according to who administers them, 
namely company managed airports (Kansai, Itami, Centrair and Narita accounting for 
29 per cent total traffic); airports administered by the central government (61 per cent); 
airports administered by local governments; and others (10 per cent) 18 (Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 HERE
In Japan, as in the UK, the number of passengers decreased after 2007 (Table 3). This 
was primarily due to poor economic conditions, the declining population, the financial 
problems of JAL, and domestic competition especially from the Shinkansen ‘bullet’ 
train. Traffic subsequently fell further in 2011 because of the devastating earthquake. 
Moreover at many Japanese airports passenger numbers also declined in between 2004-
2008 unlike in the UK. However passenger throughput increased in 2012, mostly driven 
by the entry of LCCs. Total numbers grew from 216 to 238 million. 
TABLE 3 HERE
About two thirds of the domestic passengers use Haneda Airport, with the regional 
airports facing a difficult situation because of the weak local economy, considerable 
overlapping catchment areas and competition with other transport modes. As for 
international passengers, nearly 90 per cent of international passengers use Tokyo 
(Haneda and Narita), Kansai and Centrair. This traffic distribution shows the traffic 
concentration in urban areas and relatively small use of the regional airports.
The regional airports have been engaged in a variety of initiatives intended to keep or 
grow their traffic. Typically these are aimed at airlines or passengers19. For airlines 
these include the reduction of airport charges or the guarantee of a boarding rate. The 
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boarding rate guarantee is a mechanism when the local government compensates for the 
losses of the airline, if the annual load factor fails to meet the target which was agreed 
between the local government and airline. As regards passengers, the initiatives include 
the payment of grants to reduce the total travel costs or offering free car parking. Some 
airports also use public relations activities to encourage the use of their facilities. 
However whilst such measures to reduce the burden of airport users may lessen the 
decline of passengers in the short run, increasing numbers is a much harder task, 
particularly as financial support from the local governments cannot be expected on a 
permanent basis. Moreover since these initiatives are intended to work on the demand 
side, they do nothing to streamline airport operations. This could potentially be 
achieved if the airports co-operated or used a system approach but in practice this is 
difficult to attain because of the existence of the different airport administrators. 
This situation has not been helped by the fact that the aeronautical revenues of most of 
the airports goes into a national government account that is then redistributed (with 
additional funding from general national accounts) through capital grants to the 
individual airports in accordance with five year development plans20. This pooling and 
re-allocation of funds has come under increasing criticism in recent years for producing 
an unbalanced and inefficient airport system which has led to overinvestment at a 
number of regional airports, with political rather than economic need taking priority21, 
22
. 
Moreover Japanese airports are unusual, compared with other airports, in that the non-
aeronautical facilities (such as the passenger or cargo terminal buildings and car 
parking) are managed by different entities (typically mixed public/private corporations) 
from the basic aeronautical facilities (such as runways, taxiways and aprons). This 
means that airports miss out on this additional source of income which can potentially 
be used to cross-subsidize aeronautical operations and lower airport charges. Only 
Narita, Kansai and Centrair have integrated management that has responsibility for both 
the airfield and terminal facilities.
As a result of these issues, focusing on the efficient management of airports has become 
a major policy direction of the government. Its so-called ‘Growth Strategy’ identified a 
short-term goal to revise the airport charges system, in accordance with the preferential 
treatment of smaller aircraft and the need to respond the aviation market, through a 
review of the airport accounting system. It also demonstrated a fundamental policy shift 
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towards streamlining airport management by leveraging "private sector wisdom and 
financing" in the medium term, specifically related to privatization and concession 
contracts, and the integration of aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities of 
airports23. Subsequently in 2012 the government announced that it was considering 
plans to reform the ownership and governance of the Japanese airports (excluding 
Narita, Haneda, Kansai and Centrair). From 2014 it proposed that as many of the 
airports as possible should be run by integrated companies (e.g. covering both airfield 
and terminal operations) on a long-term (30-50 years) concession basis24. This covered 
94 airports including 27 central government managed regional airports and 67 local 
government managed airports – although the focus consequently has been very much on 
the regional airports. 
4.2 Examples of private sector involvement
To date there has been little private sector involvement with Japanese airports, although 
there are a few airports, such as Asahikawa (1,060,000 passengers in 2012) and 
Shizuoka (440,000 passengers), that have entrusted operations to the private sector. 
Both of these airports issued a contract for managing the operations of aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical facilities as a package in 2007 and 2009 respectively.  These airports 
are limited both in size and revenues and the focus has been on controlling costs, 
especially those associated with staff. However these examples relate to a consignment 
contract for the purchasing of airport services by the public and are not a concession 
model that has to be used with the establishment of a Special Purpose Company (SPC). 
This latter type involves the sale of operational rights to the investors of SPCs by 
legislation, and been considered by several government administered airports such as 
Sendai and Hiroshima airport. 
The most significant example relates to Kansai airport. This airport was built on an 
artificial island of reclaimed land in the sea and was opened in 1994 to overcome 
capacities shortages and noise complaints at Itami airport which is located in a densely 
populated area. Kansai airport is actually fairly remote from the central urban area of 
Osaka. The volume of traffic has not been nearly as high as expected and the airport is 
burdened with debt of more than $US 10 billion. Moreover according to a 2011 study of 
charges at over 50 global airports25, Kansai ranked as the second most expensive airport 
(Narita came sixth). The debt problem of Kansai airport is not attributable to the 
accumulation of years of operating loss but to the loans for construction, the costs of a 
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second runway and costs of coping with the airport sinking into the sea. Although the 
amount of interest-bearing liabilities has declined, it still remains very significant. In 
fact the airport made operating profits for many years but had to allocate the greater part 
of the profits to meeting interest payments (Table 4). Meanwhile Itami has continued to 
operate as a purely domestic airport with night flying restrictions and in 2012 it handled 
13 million domestic passengers, compared to 5 million domestic and 11 million 
international at Kansai. There is also a third domestic airport Kobe nearby which was 
opened in 2006 and handles over 2 million passengers. To encourage development at 
these two other airports, the Japanese government banned aircraft with more than two 
engines at Itami from 2006 which forced JAL and ANA to switch domestic B747 flights 
to Kansai.  However traffic levels at both Kansai and Itami dropped significantly in 
recent years although grew in 2012, in common with other major Japanese airports 
(Figure 2).
TABLE 4 HERE
FIGURE 2 HERE
As already mentioned, one of the characteristics of the current funding system of 
Japanese airports is that it makes it possible to have financial cross subsidization 
between airports. This has resulted in overcapacity in the regions as airports have been 
developed with insufficient attention being given to their financial viability. It is 
generally agreed that more consideration needs to be given to independent and efficient 
management and the role of private sector in financing airports which led to the Growth 
Strategy proposals. In particular with Kansai International Airport the government  
proposed running the airport as a concession or PPP as a way to resolving this problem. 
On the 1st July 2012, the first step of the reform was took place. Before the reform, 
Kansai International Airport Company (KIAC) was a mixed public-private company 
with 67 per cent owned by central government, 15 per cent by 12 municipal 
governments and the rest owned by 803 companies and individuals.
To turn the company around, the government considered the possibility of introducing 
private management and integration with the neighbouring Itami airport, which was 100 
per cent controlled by the government and making significant profits26. However, the 
removal of a high debt burden was considered essential for introducing private 
involvement in the airport management. So for this purpose, it was thought that hiving 
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off the ownership of the land would make it possible to remove liabilities and related 
costs including depreciation. The main reform at this time was mainly focused on the 
merger of the airports. The land was split off, and then Kansai airport was integrated 
with the profitable Itami airport. The idea was to use the airport profits as a means for 
repaying the debt and making the interest payments of Kansai airport. 
Therefore two new companies were established, namely New Kansai International 
Airport Company, Ltd. (NKIAC) which is fully owned by the government, and a land 
ownership company of Kansai airport which is owned by NKIAC (67%) and municipal 
governments (33%) (Figure 3).. NKIAC manages and operates the runways of both 
airports, owns the land assets of Itami airport and the terminal facilities of Kansai. The 
terminal building at Itami was taken over as a wholly owned subsidiary of NKIAC in 
2013. The land company has taken over Kansai’s land assets and the rest of the debt. It 
is likely to lease its assets to NKIAC using the lease payments to repay the debt. It is 
planned that the rights to operate NKIAC will be transferred to the private sector in 
terms of a concession agreement. The Japanese Government will continue to own 
NKIAC’s shares.
FIGURE 3 HERE 
5. Discussion and conclusions
The last few years have clearly been a very challenging and volatile time for the 
Japanese airport industry. Moreover the Japanese aviation environment is changing with 
more liberal market access and more relaxed ownership rules. JAL is now profitable 
again and back on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and new LCC operations have boosted 
traffic. Indeed the LCC seat capacity increased from a domestic share of 2.6 per cent 
and international share of 9 per cent in 2011 to 4.4 and 20.3 respectively in 201227. This 
has encouraged the planning or building of LCC facilities at airports such as Centrair, 
Okinawa Naha, Narita and Kansai - just as has been seen in other countries when the 
LCC sector has expanded operations. However such strategies are not without risk as 
experience elsewhere, and particularly in the UK, has shown that LCCs can be very 
footloose and volatile, and can cause traffic levels to dramatically fall as well as grow. 
Indeed already in Japan, Japan Air Asia has ceased operations although other new LCCs 
such as Peach and Jetstar Japan seem to be having greater success. 
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Meanwhile Japanese airports continue to face several key problems. The first is the lack 
of integrated airport management models. This means that most airport operators in 
Japan are not able to take advantage of the often substantial revenues from commercial 
facilities, typically accounting for 40 per cent of all revenues in the UK. Secondly, the 
pooling system of airport account still makes it possible to cross subsidization between 
airports. However the airport industry is at a pivotal time in terms of its development 
with the government through its so-called Growth Strategy suggesting greater private 
sector involvement to overcome these problems. With the strategy recommending 
private sector involvement in Japanese airports, a key question is what kind of investors 
are to be expected, or what will be the likely pattern of the airports’ financing. 
In the UK, privatization has brought many types of investors. For example in 2006, 
BAA was taken over by the consortium composed of a Spanish construction company; 
Ferrovial (55.87%) and two foreign financial investors Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du 
Québec (26.48%) and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (17.65%). 
In 2010 the OFT reported that there were a total of 52 investors at UK airports. Of these 
52 investors, 16 were financial investors and 14 other private sector entities. The 
remaining 22 were composed of 18 public institutions, two foreign public institutions 
and two unknown investors. The number of financial investors owning over 50 per cent 
of the shares of airports was only four, whilst the number of financial investors owning 
up to 50 per cent was 12. By contrast, the number of other private sector investors 
owning more than 50 per cent of the shares was 12, with only two owning less than 50 
per cent. This appeared to indicate that at this time although the financial sector 
investors were major supporters of airports, they did not always seek to acquire control 
of the airports and preferred to focus on financial gains through dividends or resale. 
Nevertheless, whatever the type of investor, it will clearly pursue a financial return and 
will want to ensure that the risks borne by the airport company are limited or properly 
managed. Even though the experience in the UK appears to show that it is possible to 
have a reasonably healthy and competitive regional system being operated 
predominantly by private operators, this is very dependent on economic factors and the 
nature of demand, and consequently becomes that much more challenging in difficult 
times. The transfer back of Cardiff and Prestwick airports to public hands in 2013 (the 
latter for just a £1) is a good illustration of this.
Overall there is only limited and rather inconclusive evidence in the UK as to whether 
privatization has actually improved the efficiency and well-being of the airports. For 
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example, studies by Parker28, Holvad and Graham29, Barros and Weber30 and Barros31 
found no clear relationship between ownership and efficiency or productivity whilst, by 
contrast, Bottasso and Conti32 observed that privatized UK airports seemed to have 
lower costs compared to public or mixed ones. Whilst many industry commentators, 
including the CAA33, have acknowledged that the UK airport industry has become more 
commercial in its outlook, Ison et al.34 have actually argued that it is this alone, rather 
than privatization, that has brought benefits to the airports. The privatization models 
being suggested for Japan are very different than those generally adopted in UK, but 
experience in this latter country does show that benefits of private sector involvement 
may not always occur as expected.
Another key issue is airport competition. Both the UK and Japan have too many 
regional airports to serve the level of demand. The solution in the UK regions has 
generally been to interfere only when group ownership threatened airport competition, 
but otherwise to primarily leave the industry to sort out the distribution of traffic. By 
contrast in Japan some common ownership could well help to overcome some of the 
financial problems faced by airports and allow for a more coordinated approach, but in 
the long-run as the airport industry develops in an increasingly more liberal aviation 
environment, the impact on competition may very well need to be addressed.  
The Japanese government is proposing that the regional airports should be run by 
integrated companies on a long-term concession basis. There are good and poor 
experiences of airport concession operations in various parts of the world. The practice 
in the UK is limited to Luton airport, and although generally this has been considered as 
a relative success, it has not been without its problems. For the Japanese airports in 
aiming to attract the private investor, it will be very important to take full consideration 
of the business risks. Ultimately if there are excessive requirements demanded by the 
public sector this will make it impossible to find private investors. Thus the need for an 
effective and workable risk-sharing mechanism between the government and the private 
sector concessionaires will be vital for these reforms to succeed.
The proposals at Kansai are particularly challenging. On a positive note since NKIAC 
took over operations, landing charges have been reduced by five per cent with further 
reductions during overnight hours. Furthermore, incentives as in the UK, are planned 
for the future to encourage new services. A key aim for NKIAC, surely vital for success, 
is to make its charges comparable with Narita and to improve its competitiveness with 
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other Asian hubs. The airport company even has plans to develop an overseas strategy 
with possible involvement with other international airports. The group management of 
Kansai and Itami, driven by financial motives, can potentially also allow for more 
strategic and coordinated development but again as in the UK, the impact on possible 
competition could be an issue in the future. Therefore there is an essential need to define 
the role of the airports, particularly Itami, where a relaxation of the operating 
restrictions, together with international services, is favoured by some. Others support 
the development of Kansai as the main airport (with a high speed link to central Osaka) 
- especially as there are plans for a maglev rail line between Tokyo and Osaka which 
would reduce domestic traffic substantially at Itami. 
As already discussed, in the past the Japanese government has encouraged domestic 
traffic to shift from Itami to Kansai. Route development and slot management remain 
outside the control of the airport management company but handing over route 
development to the discretion of the airport company, debatably, must be critical for the 
success of any private airport management company. In the UK, slot constraints restrict 
operations, particularly at the London airports, but otherwise the airports are reasonably 
free to welcome any traffic that they can attract, assuming that there are no operating or 
environmental constraints.  
   
In December 2012 it was revealed that NKIAC was already considering foreign and 
domestic investors to manage the airports for 40-50 years, with the aim of raising $US7-
15 billion. The deal is expected to be completed by 201535. However in addition to these 
traffic allocation concerns, two other key issues remain to be resolved. The first is 
related to the concession arrangement, as the value of the concession contract will have 
to be very expensive if the government aims to have full repayment of the liabilities of 
Kansai airport. According to the estimation of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the turnover of NKIAC needs to be more than $US 1.5 
billion if existing liabilities are to be repaid in 45 years36. This estimation of turnover 
was based on the highest turnover ever accomplished at Kansai airport in 1997 and the 
current turnover of $US 150 million at Itami. If these levels cannot be attained, the 
scheme is likely to fail. Discretionary intervention by the government would distort 
market incentives and reduce the attraction of the business to investors. Hence the 
privatization of NKIAC, due to the huge debt and uncertainty over the integrated 
management at Itami and control over route development, is likely to be very 
challenging to attract the private sector investors that are needed. 
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The second issue is related to the financial viability of the airports. The introduction of a 
concession system with the establishment of a SPC has been considered at many 
airports in Japan. However the estimated results of Kato et al37 and the report of the 
balance of payments of the government administrated airport surveyed by the 
government, indicate that there are very few profitable airports. The success of the 
concession system may well depend on institutional changes that make airports more 
attractive to private sector investors. In the UK, regional airport operators become 
public limited companies in 1987, but other than that no major institutional alterations 
were needed when these airports were privatized. However in Japan it is unlikely that a 
focus purely on the stimulation of demand will be sufficient for investors and it may 
well be necessary to produce changes aimed at producing more efficient operations.   
In conclusion, this paper has focused on two countries which are at different stages of 
the evolution of their airport industries. The UK aviation sector has benefitted from the 
growth encouraged by liberalization and has a very commercially orientated airport 
industry, which arguably is at least partly due to airport privatization which is almost 
complete in the UK. However the recent difficult conditions have shown that for this 
‘mature’ industry, competing for airline traffic, remaining financially healthy and 
retaining investors can be challenging. Whilst the Japanese airport industry is clearly 
very different and has some certain unique characteristics, nevertheless the commercial 
and integrated approach to operating UK airports, as well as competition issues, are 
relevant to Japan as it plans to enter into a new era of airport management. In particular 
the proposed privatization of NKIAC, if successful, represents a key policy shift as 
regards airport provision for the government which has previously favored state 
management and is bound be an important test case for further private sector 
involvement at other airports. 
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Table 1: Passengers (millions) at major UK Airports 2004/05-2012/13 (FY) by 
main owners/investors
04/05 05/06
06/0
7 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11
11/1
2 12/13
% 
annual 
growt
h
04/05
-08/09
% 
annual 
growt
h
08/09-
12/13
BAA
Aberdeen 2.7 3.0 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.4 5.3 0.3
Edinburgh 8.1 8.5 6.8 9.1 9.0 9.1 8.6 9.4 9.5 2.8 1.2
Glasgow 8.6 8.8 7.2 8.7 8.1 7.2 6.5 6.9 7.2 -1.4 -3.2
Heathrow 67.7 67.4 52.0 67.9 66.9 65.9 65.8 69.4 70.0 -0.3 1.1
Stansted 21.3 22.3 18.8 23.8 22.4 20.0 18.6 18.0 17.6 1.3 -5.9
Southampton 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 5.9 -3.6
GIP
London City 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.1 17.9 -1.1
Gatwick 32.0 32.9 27.4 35.2 34.2 37.7 31.7 33.9 34.2 1.7 0.0
MAG
Manchester 21.3 27.6 22.2 22.0 20.4 18.1 17.7 19.1 19.8 -1.1 -0.8
East 
Midlands
4.4 4.2 5.0 5.6 5.3 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.8 -7.1
Bournemouth 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 20.5 -10.8
Humberside 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 -5.2 -18.7
Abertis
Belfast Int 3.5 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.3 10.2 -4.7
Cardiff 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 6.6 -15.4
Luton 7.5 9.2 9.4 9.9 10.2 9.1 8.8 9.5 9.6 7.8 -1.4
Peel/Vantage
Liverpool 3.5 4.7 5.1 5.6 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.2 4.4 10.4 -4.0
Doncaster - - 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 - -7.6
Durham TV 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -9.2 -26.3
Ontario Teachers Pensions Plan
Birmingham 8.8 9.4 9.0 9.3 9.5 9.0 8.5 8.6 8.9 2.0 -1.5
Bristol 3.7 5.2 5.7 5.8 6.2 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.9 13.5 -1.2
Regional and City
Blackpool 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -3.1 -8.6
Exeter 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 9.1 -7.6
HIAL 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 6.8 0.0
Other 
Leeds 
Bradford
2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.0
Newcastle 4.7 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.4 1.4 -3.5
Note: The grouping of airports has changed over the years. This shows the situation at 
the beginning of the financial year 2012-13. In 2012 GIP bough Edinburgh airport and 
Humberside airport was sold by MAG to Eastern Airways. In 2013 MAG bought 
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Stansted airport, the Welsh Government bought Cardiff airport, ADC & HAS Airports 
Worldwide bought Belfast International, and AENA/AXA Private Equity took over the 
Luton concession. BAA is now called Heathrow Airport Holdings.
Sources: CRI and LeighFisher
Table 2: Operating margin (%) at major UK Airports 2004/05-2012/13 (FY) by 
main owners/investors
04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13
BAA
Aberdeen 32.5 32.2 37.1 36.6 37.6 14.6 24.4 27.1 14.8
Edinburgh 38.7 40.6 42.4 40.5 41.5 20.1 34.3 23.9 28.5
Glasgow 29.9 31.2 36.7 30.8 35.7 9.9 28.8 19.2 10.1
Heathrow 36.7 34.7 30.1 21.5 11.1 7.3 26.0 25.7 24.4
Stansted 27.4 26.1 25.8 31.3 31.4 11.3 26.6 16.6 23.1
Southampton 40.4 39.9 35.9 24.0 21.3 -64.9 32.2 22.5 4.4
GIP
London City 19.6 18.9 31.0 44.5 47.0 28.4 24.5 26.2 24.9
Gatwick 29.1 22.3 28.5 19.7 22.3 -6.2 20.1 22.5 21.6
MAG
Manchester 29.4 24.7 24.1 27.8 21.6 22.8 21.2 23.3 29.4
East 
Midlands
34.1 31.3 14.9 35.9 25.9 24.2 16.0 14.8 23.6
Bournemouth 24.8 20.8 20.0 21.8 17.9 19.8 11.0 -0.1 27.3
Humberside 14.9 5.9 5.7 5.2 1.6 -7.1 -8.5 -1.0 -1.0
Abertis
Belfast Int 23.5 30.2 33.7 34.0 26.3 13.7 10.8 14.9 13.6
Cardiff 39.2 26.9 30.6 33.0 25.6 7.8 15.6 2.3 -11.4
Luton 22.0 16.7 14.4 17.6 20.1 19.6 20.1 21.2 20.7
Liverpool 3.2 63.7 1.8 13.3 12.4 3.4 6.7 11.1 8.7
Peel/Vantage
Doncaster - - - -81.5 33.8 -95.7 -49.3 22.9 -201.0
Durham TV -10.9 -25.1 -33.0 -21.6 -44.4 -150.9 -24.6 22.9 -71.5
Ontario Teachers Pensions Plan
Birmingham 31.0 31.9 21.0 21.9 19.7 12.8 17.8 21.6 23.0
Bristol 50.9 51.1 47.7 45.6 44.0 41.0 41.1 39.4 37.7
Regional and City 
Blackpool -45.1 -47.6 -52.5 -52.2 -36.6 -52.9 -44.4 -26.1 -28.6
Exeter 10.9 5.6 2.1 -2.4 7.0 2.4 3.1 1.6 -1.7
HIAL -4.8 -3.4 -6.8 -5.6 -3.8 0.3 -7.4 -2.7 -2.5
Others
Leeds 
Bradford
7.8 6.5 6.9 -8.1 -12.1 -23.6 -34.7 -21.3 -22.4
Newcastle 45.9 37.1 20.8 35.6 35.0 32.1 28.3 29.1 30.3
Note: The grouping of airports had changed over the years. This shows the situation at 
the beginning of the financial year 2012-13. The operating margin is the operating profit 
as a percentage of the operating revenue. 
Sources: CRI and LeighFisher
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Table3: Passengers (millions) at the 30 largest Japanese Airports 2004-2012 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 % 
annual 
growt
h
08/04
% 
annual 
growt
h
12/08
Akita 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 -2.6 -1.1
Aomori 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 -2.8 -8.2
Asahikawa 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.1 4.1 -5.1
Centrair - 10.8 11.7 11.6 11.0 9.2 9.3 8.6 9.1 - -4.6
Fukuoka 18.5 18.7 18.2 17.9 17.3 15.9 16.3 15.4 17.4 -1.7 0.2
Hakodate 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 -5.5 -3.8
Haneda 62.3 63.3 66.1 66.8 66.7 61.9 64.2 62.6 66.7 1.7 0.0
Hiroshima 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.7 -0.9 -4.2
Ishigaki 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.1 -3.5
Itami 19.3 18.9 17.1 16.2 15.6 14.6 14.8 12.8 13.2 -5.2 -4.1
Kagoshima 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.7 -1.2 -4.0
Kansai 15.1 16.3 16.4 16.4 15.8 13.3 14.2 13.3 15.9 1.0 0.2
Kitakyushu 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 44.1 0.5
Kobe - - 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.5 - -2.2
Kochi 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 -4.0 -2.3
Komatsu 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.2 -0.9 -2.7
Kumamoto 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 0.5 -1.6
Matsuyama 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 -0.5 -2.3
Miyako 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 0.4 3.8
Miyazaki 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.7 -0.7 -2.9
Nagasaki 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 -1.1 1.3
Naha 12.7 13.5 14.2 15.0 15.2 14.0 14.5 13.7 15.0 4.5 -0.2
Narita 31.0 31.4 31.7 32.3 30.4 28.9 30.8 25.4 30.0 -0.4 -0.4
Niigata 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 -6.7 -3.1
Oita 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 -1.7 -4.1
Okayama 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 -2.3 -1.6
Sendai 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 1.7 2.7 -1.4 -3.3
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Shin-chitose 17.6 17.9 18.4 18.3 17.7 16.5 16.7 15.8 17.5 0.1 -0.3
Takamatsu 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 -0.3 -1.3
Toyama 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 -4.3 -5.0
Source: Kuko Kanri Jokyo Chosho (Investigation for Conditions of Airport Control)
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Table 4: Financial performance of Kansai airports (2004/05-2012/13 FY)  
　 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13
Operating 
revenues 
($US 
million)
1,073 1,078 1,090 1,094 1,022 891 921 910 1,049 
Operating 
costs ($US 
million)
853 844 825 836 840 762 725 727 773 
Operating 
margin 
(%)
21 22 24 24 18 15 21 20 26 
Operating 
profit 
($US 
million) 
219 234 265 258 183 130 196 183 276 
Net profit 
($US 
million)
46 -183 101 112 -69 1 76 85 186 
Interest bearing debt at year-end ($US bn) 12 11 11 10 10 
Note: 2012 includes KIAC (April-June) and NKIAC (April-March). In the year Kansai 
airport generated an operating profit of $US 222 million and Itami $US 54 million.
Source: NKIAC
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Figure 1: Passenger numbers at Japanese airports 2012
Source: MLIT
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Figure 2: Passenger numbers (000s) at Kansai and Itami airports (2004/05-2012/13 
FY) 
Source: NKIAC
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Figure 3: The changing structure of management of Kansai and Itami airport 
operators
Itami Kansai Itami Kansai
Terminal
Building
Osaka
International
Airport Terminal
Co.,LTD.
Osaka International
Airport Terminal
Co.,LTD.
Airport (air
side) operation
lease contract
Land ownership
Kansai International
Airport Land Co.,
Ltd.
Kansai
International
Airport Company,
Ltd.
J apanese
Government
New Kansai International Airport
Company, Ltd. (NKIAC)
Wholly owned subsidiary
conctract out 
with ivestors 
(concession)
Note: New Kansai International Airport Company, Ltd. (NKIAC) is wholly owned by 
the Japanese government. The shareholders of Kansai International Airport Land Co., 
Ltd. are NKIAC (67%) and municipal governments (33%).
Source: Compiled by the authors
